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Date

Abstract
The Integrity Measurements Architecture (IMA) [5] provides attestation and integrity for
Linux hosts. But what if an administrator wants to provide IMA functionality to an older
(non-IMA capable) or a non Linux-based OS? If the system is deployed on top of a
hypervisor, IMA functionality can be provided at the hypervisor level. This paper applies
Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) to provide IMA functionality to virtualized guest
OSes. We implement a proof of concept library (using a shallow shadow filesystem) and
integrate it with the Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) hypervisor. The
modifications provide the Linux host OS the ability to see when and what files are being
accessed by the guest OS. This paper outlines the approach to its design, concept of
execution, and describes the challenges encountered. The library is tested with a sample
bash script created in a monitored partition; a hash of the file is printed before the file is
loaded into memory.
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1 Introduction
Today, more systems owners are realizing their hardware is being under-utilized, and
virtualization is becoming a common solution. Virtualization allows multiple server
instances to exist on the same hardware, reducing Size, Weight, and Power (SWAP),
while still providing isolation. In a virtualized environment, a new layer is introduced
between the hardware and the server software. This virtualization layer provides an
environment to monitor the activity of virtual machines. This monitoring code lives
outside the guest OS, making it less susceptible to attacks. While being isolated from the
guest OS provides a security advantage, a high level view of its activity is lost. The
challenge lies in rebuilding this view and being able to identify guest OS activity (e.g.,
disk activity, process loading). Providing this of view in to the VM is called Virtual
Machine Introspection. VM Introspection can be applied to provide various security
benefits to VMs [1] [2] [3]; one of them being integrity measurements.
The virtualization layer handles requests from VMs for data on a hard disk drive. The
guest OS makes requests for data to this layer, and uses sector numbers to specify which
unit of data it's requesting. This research builds upon the fundamental theory of building
a table of logical block numbers, and using that table to map blocks to logical files.
Being able to do this provides the virtualization layer a view into what files are being
accessed by the guest OS. In order to realize this theory, the filesystem to be monitored
needs to be parsed and its meta-data stored. More specifically, for each file in the
filesystem, its logical blocks need to be recorded, essentially building a shallow shadow
filesystem.
The goal of this research is to be able to measure files (of the virtual disk) before they're
loaded by their respective VM. A measurement is a SHA-1 hash of the file contents. A
shallow shadow filesystem is used, in contrast to a deep shadow filesystem, which is a bit
for bit copy. Our approach uses only the meta-data of a target filesystem, and doesn't
need to clone the entire filesystem. A proof of concept is developed to illustrate the
feasibility and challenges associated with this application of VMI. For our proof of
concept the Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) is used for the hypervisor, Gentoo
Linux as the guest OS, and the Second Extended Filesystem (EXT2) for the filesystem.
-1-

The scope of this research is limited to the notification of files being accessed, and
hashing the contents. File writes will not be a part of this research, but will be discussed
in Challenges and Future Work (7).
In the next sections (2, 3, and 4), we give an overview of IMA, KVM, and the EXT2
filesystem. We outline the proof of concept and explanation of the environment in
section 5. We realize that the work in this paper is limited in scope, and is only
scratching the surface of integrity in Virtual Machines; we outline the challenges that
were encountered and possible future work in section 7.

1.1 Related Work
Currently, COTS hypervisors already provide VM Introspection utilities. VMware offers
a proprietary technology for Virtual Infrastructure called VMSafe [11]. This technology
allows 3rd party vendors to develop security tools that take advantage of VM
Introspection. VMSafe allows a security application to view the contents of Memory
pages, CPU state, network packets, and storage, but didn't appear to have the ability to
examine a file before it is loaded.
Payne, Carbone, and Lee implemented the XenAccess [7] monitoring library for VMs
using the Xen hypervisor. Their research allowed for introspection of virtual memory
and disk. XenAccess is similar to the work presented in this paper, because the inference
engine is dependant on knowledge of the filesystem in use [7]. So far, knowledge has
been included in the inference engine to be able to determine only file/directory
creation/removal operations under the ext2 filesystem, although knowledge about other
filesystems can be incorporated [7]. We have taken their research one step further, by
allowing the hypervisor to know which files are loaded.
Kourai and Chiba implement a solution called HyperSpector [9], which uses a full
shadow filesystem. Instead of providing a shallow copy of the monitored filesystem,
HyperSpector creates a full clone, and has a mediator that handles I/O requests from the
shadow-filesystem to the real filesystem.
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2 IMA Overview
The Integrity Measurements Architecture (IMA) [6] motivates the research presented in
this paper. IMA is the implementation of a secure integrity measurement system for
Linux. Integrity and attestation play an important role in high assurance applications [10]
[6]. IMA provides an OS with the ability to passively take measurements on all files
loaded in to memory. IMA follows the operating principle of, "measuring software
before loading it". A system following this principle would record the fact that software
has been loaded, even if it is malicious. Malicious software cannot change this fact
because the measurement is taken prior to being loaded, and IMA maintains the
measurements list in the kernel.
In TPM-based Attestation, after a value is added to the measurement list, the list is
hashed and the value is extended in Platform Configuration Register (PCR - normally
160 bits) #10 of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware chip [11]. The Trusted
Platform Module is a secure crypto-processor that store cryptographic keys, and other
valuable information. The PCR always contains an aggregate of the current measurement
list. PCR values of the TPM cannot be overwritten directly; they can only be extended.
The extend operation of the PCR is handled by taking the new value and hashing it with
the previous, as described in Figure 2-1.
PCR := SHA-1(OldVal + measurement)
Figure 2-1: PCR Extend Operation

Using the measurements list, and the aggregate value (hash of list) in the PCR, a verifier
can recreate (or verify) the software that was loaded on the target machine. A verifying
host would perform the following to validate an IMA enabled host:
•

Gather measurement list and value held in PCR #10

•

For each measurement in the list, generate a hash of the measurement along with
the previous value in the PCR.

After the entire measurement list has been processed, the value computed is compared to
the value gathered from PCR #10. The verifier is essentially recreating the current PCR
value and so it can make a decision on the validity of software running on the host.
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The table below is a sample of the entries of an integrity measurements list.
Table 2-1: Sample Measurement List [17]
#007

CFBC7EC3302145AB78A307C0D41DBB9A4251377B

mmap-file

libnss_files2.3.2.so

Library

#008

805572455CF5BF50A7EE42E3CC6B0EDA65AF17A4

mmap-file

initlog

Executable

#009

C95CBC5625719649103E0D1C3595967474842F7B

mmap-file

hostname

Executable

#010

0CAA342424F420FF29B7FB2FCF278F973600681B

mmap-file

mount

Executable

In an IMA enabled host, the TPM would be the hardware root of trust, and a verifier does
not have to rely on the trustworthiness of the software environment. The only caveat of
IMA is it's only available for capable Linux kernels. Systems using older Linux kernels
would need a back port of IMA for that specific kernel version. This doesn't take into
account systems that aren't Linux based. For this research, we pull IMA functionality out
of the VM and use the virtualization layer as the root of trust, since it is the mechanism
that takes the measurements. Pulling the IMA functionality out of the guest OS removes
the OS type restriction as well.

3 KVM Background
KVM, is a Linux virtualization infrastructure, which provides a native virtualization
environment but requires modifications to the host OS (the KVM kernel module), in
contrast to paravirtualization which requires no modification to either guest or host (e.g.,
VMware Workstation). KVM uses a modified version of the QEMU emulation software
to provide address space, simulated I/O, and mapping display back to the host. The most
relevant portion of QEMU to this research is the I/O code. This I/O code is where we
inject lookup code to our shadow filesystem. It is also where we will call our
measurement code.
KVM parent company Qumranet was recently (Sept. 2008) acquired by RedHat, and the
kernel component of KVM is included in mainline Linux, as of 2.6.20.

4 EXT2 Background
For this research, EXT2 is selected as the filesystem. EXT2 implements a common set of
UNIX filesystem concepts, the most relevant concept to this research being the inode.
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The inode represents files and directories and contains all meta-data related to a file
including:
•

Type

•

Permissions

•

Timestamps (access, create, modified)

•

Size

•

Pointers to data

Figure 4-1: Blocks of Inode [23]

Figure 4-1 illustrates the structure of the inode. Infos represent the meta-data described
above. The rest of the inode contain 32-bit pointers to the data blocks. Each inode has
room for 15 addresses (represented by the EXT2_N_BLOCKS macro), but only elements
0 to 11 store addresses of actual data blocks. Block 12 contains the address to another
table of block addresses called indirect blocks; block 13 contains an address to a table of
addresses to tables of addresses of data blocks called double indirect blocks; block 14
holds triple indirect blocks.
In order to read the inodes of an EXT2 filesystem, a library called libext2fs is
required. Many of the Linux filesystem tools (e.g., mke2fs, e2fsck) use this library to
carry out their duties. This library contains functions to read the superblock, inodes, data
blocks, and other data types of the filesystem. For this research, we are interested in
-5-

iterating through each inode and recording the block numbers that it contains. The
libext2fs library is contained in the Linux package e2fsprogs.

5 Proof of Concept
This research develops a proof of concept to illustrate the feasibility of being able to
identify a file is being loaded into memory by knowing its blocks. In this section we
describe our hardware and software environment, how the virtual disk is constructed, the
design of the lookup table, and how the library works.

5.1 Environment
For the proof of concept, the following hardware and software system configurations is
utilized:
Table 5-1: Hardware System Configuration
Hardware Item

Configuration

Northbridge Chipset

Intel Q35

CPU

Intel E6750

RAM

3GB PC5300

Hard Disk

2x250GB

The hardware was specifically chosen because the E6750 CPU offers Intel®
Virtualization Technology (VT). AMD also has hardware virtualization technology
called AMD-V™. In order to take advantage of this CPU feature, the Q35 was required.
Rather than build a custom machine, this machine was procured from Lenovo using
readily available configurations. Intel® VT is needed because KVM requires this feature
to provide native virtualization.
Table 5-2 describes the software configuration for development of the proof of concept.
Open source software is used when available, and trial licenses were obtained as needed.
64 bit Redhat Enterprise Linux Server 5 is used as the host OS, and Gentoo Linux
(2008.0 profile) is used as the guest. The reason for the difference in OSes is because we
didn’t want an installer to partition our virtual disk for us; also, we didn’t want to use
Logical Volume Manager (LVM). e2fsprogs provides libext2fs and OpenSSL
provides the cryptographic library.
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Table 5-2: Software System Configuration
Software Item

Configuration

Host OS

Redhat Enterprise Linux Server 5 x86_64

Hypervisor

Kernel-based Virtual Machine-77

Guest OS

Gentoo Linux 2008.0

Guest OS Filesystem

ext2/3

Guest OS Virtual disk format

raw

Filesystem library

e2fsprogs-1.39

Cryptographic library

openssl-0.9.8j

5.2 The Virtual Disk
Like host OSes, VMs need a disk to boot from and store its files. VMs usually use a
large file to represent the virtual disk. This virtual disk will represent the hard disk in
which KVM can boot from and store guest OS files. KVM comes with a tool called
qemu-img, which creates the virtual disk in various formats. For portability and
simplicity reasons, we've chosen to use the default raw image format for our virtual disk.
The raw format is a plain binary image of the hard disk, and supports copying directly to
and from the host OS.
To create the virtual disk the following command is used:
#qemu-img create vdisk.img 10GB
Figure 5-1: Image Creation Command

This command allocates a 10GB virtual disk to a file called vdisk.img using the raw
format. The raw format is used by default, which is why no command line option is used.

-7-

Figure 5-2: fdisk Output

Once the virtual disk is created, partitions are created and formatted. Figure 5-2 illustrates
the output from fdisk for the virtual disk. A traditional Linux partition scheme is
chosen for simplicity, which consists of three partitions: boot, swap, and root ('/'). The
boot partition uses an ext2 filesystem, while the root partition utilizes an ext3 partition
with journaling.
In order to handle this virtual image like a physical disk, a couple of technologies will
need to be used. The mount command is used to mount a filesystem, but since this is not
a physical disk, a couple of options need to be used. If the virtual disk were to be
mounted on a Linux system, the following command would be used:
#mount -o loop,offset=32256 vdisk.img /mnt/image
Figure 5-3: Mount Boot Partition Command

This command makes an internal call to losetup to create the loop device and use an
offset into the disk image. The offset determines which partition is to be mounted. In
order to come up with the number for the offset, a couple of parameters need to be
gathered: (block size, partition start position). Looking at the partition scheme in Figure
5-2,

and using the u command in fdisk to switch the units to sectors, we can see that the
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boot partition starts at sector 63. Each sector is 512 bytes, which means the boot partition
begin at 32256 bytes from the start of the file. The formula for the calculation is as
follows:
(63 × 512) = 32556
If the root partition were to be mounted, the following command would be used:

#mount -o loop,offset=41126400 vdisk.img /mnt/image
Figure 5-4: Mount Root Partition Command

For this proof of concept, we're limiting the shadow filesystem to the boot partition since
it contains fewer files.
Figure 5-5 illustrates the disk and shows the physical layout of the disk. The test file

ps.sh resides in the boot partition.

Figure 5-5: Disk Layout

5.3 Design
The following section describes the detailed design for the library that is developed to
support the shadow filesystem and the shadow filesystem implementation itself.

5.3.1 The Shadow Filesystem
The shadow filesystems main component is the lookup table. The lookup table is
composed of 3 core structures: s_inode, s_block, and s_shadow_fs.
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Figure 5-6: Lookup Table

Figure 5-6 illustrates the look up table for our shadow filesystem. The array of blocks
contains pointers to the inode in which it belongs to, allowing quick reverse lookups for
any block. Each inode in the array of inodes contain a pointer to the first block of the
inode as described later (s_inode).

Figure 5-7: s_block Structure

The s_block structure encapsulates the meta-data for a block of data. The first
attribute of the structure is a Boolean to determine if the block is the first of a group of
blocks of a file. KVM receives requests for blocks independently, making it necessary to
add logic to determine which block represents a file. Without this logic, each block
request would look like a file request. For example, given a file fileA (made up of
blocks {1, 2, 3}) that is loaded into memory, KVM would see requests for blocks 1, 2,
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and 3. Without the first Boolean, the shadow filesystem would interpret that as three
separate attempts to access fileA. Using the first Boolean, we would only take into
account when the first block is loaded, making the assumption that the VM is trying to
load fileA, because files normally load bytes in sequence. Only requests for blocks
that have the first attribute set to 1 are processed, while others are discarded.

block_num is a number of the type blk_t (from libext2fs) and represents the
block number. The inode_p attribute is a pointer to the inode this block belongs to.

Figure 5-8: s_inode Structure

The s_inode structure represents the meta-data for an inode, currently the

file_name attribute serves as a placeholder for a meaningful file name. The EXT2
filesystem represents files as inodes and inodes can have multiple names associated with
it. Associating a filename would give more meaning than an inode number.

inode_num represents the inode number, which is most relevant, but not as useful as a
filename. i_size represents the size of the file, which is used for hashing its contents.
The first_block attribute is a pointer to the first block for this particular inode.

Figure 5-9: s_shadow_fs Structure

The s_shadow_fs structure encapsulates our shadow filesystem. It contains
information relevant to the filesystem it is shadowing. image is a string representation
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of the path for the hard disk image, dev represents the loop device the virtual disk image
is attached to, and offset represents the offset into the virtual disk. It also includes
pointers to functions which setup/close as well as provides lookup information.
The open_shadow_fs function contains functionality to create the loop device, read
the filesystem information, and build the lookup table. The

get_inode_from_block function gets the inode given a block number. The
hash_inode function hashes the contents of an inode and prints the SHA-1 hash out to
console. close_shadow_fs performs cleanup and removes the loop device.

5.4 Concept of Execution

Figure 5-10: Software Flow Diagram

Figure 5-10 illustrates the flow of execution for our proof of concept. In order to take
advantage of Intel® VT and the hardware virtualization technology, the kvm and kvm-

intel kernel modules need to be loaded into the kernel.
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#insmod kernel/x86/kvm.ko
#insmod kernel/x86/kvm-intel.ko
Figure 5-11: Kernel Module Install Commands

We launch the hypervisor by executing the following command, specifying our virtual
disk using the hda option and allocate 384MB of ram for the guest OS.

#qemu-system-x86_64 -hda vdisk.img -m 384
Figure 5-12: Starting KVM Command

Once KVM has been launched (initial state in flow diagram), control is passed to the
shadow filesystem to read and process the contents of the original filesystem. It creates a
loop device so it can read the file as a block device. The filesystem is loaded and a
mapping is built (detailed in section 5.5). Control is passed back to KVM to load the
virtual disk and let the guest OS use it to boot. When the guest OS is operational, the
shadow filesystem is ready to service requests for lookup. When the guest OS makes a
request for a block, control is passed to the shadow filesystem to lookup the blocks and
determines which inode is being accessed. This information is collected, the contents of
the inode is hashed and reported back to the host OS via console. Figure 5-13 illustrates
what is happening inside the guest OS, while Figure 5-14 illustrates the host OS. The
guest OS mounts the boot partition (the partition we're monitoring), and executes the file

(/boot/bin/ps). This creates the output on Figure 5-13. The guest OS continues to
print information pertaining to the file to verify the proper inode has been hashed. A
directory listing is performed to include inode numbers and the inode for

/boot/bin/ps is 8037. Also, inside the guest OS, a hash is generated for the file and
produces the same output as our shadow filesystem, validating our proof of concept.
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Figure 5-13: Guest OS Output

Figure 5-14: Host OS Output
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The hash is computed by using the OpenSSL cryptographic library. The shadow
filesystem keeps track of which blocks belong to an inode. In order to hash the contents
of an inode, the lseek and read functions are used to read a file from the virtual disk.
The call to lseek would include the offset into the virtual disk. The offset is calculated
by multiplying the sector number (of the file being accessed) and 512 (bytes per sector).
The assumption is that data blocks for an inode are contiguous. Even if this assumption
is false, all blocks for a given inode are still available in our lookup table.
Once the data of the file are obtained, calls to the OpenSSL EVP API [23] are made to
hash them. EVP is a high level interface to the OpenSSL cryptographic functions. Bytes
are read from the virtual disk in segments, so the MD_CTX (message digest context)
structure is used. As bytes are read, they are fed into the MD_CTX structure using the

EVP_DigestUpdate function. After all bytes are read, a call to
EVP_DigestFinal_ex is made to indicate the end of input and resources are cleaned
up using EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup. The final computed hash is stored in an allocated
character buffer.
Due to the fact that the raw disk format is being used, the raw block driver is used by
KVM (block-raw-posix.c). This is the file that requires modification to include
lookup code to our shadow filesystem. More specifically, the raw_aio_read function
houses the code which setups up asynchronous access to data on the virtual disk. One of
the parameters passed to the raw_aio_read function is the sector number needed by
our lookup function.

5.5 Building the Lookup Table
Building the lookup table involves using the libext2fs library to read the filesystem
information. The following section describes how the shadow filesystem is built in the
proof of concept. In order to read the virtual disk as a block device, a loop device needs
to be created using losetup and the virtual disk needs to be attached to it. Once the
loop device is created, the libext2fs library can be used on the device as if it was a
physical hard disk.
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The filesystem is opened using ext2fs_open. libext2fs uses an abstract structure
called ext2_inode_scan to scan the filesystem. The ext2_get_next_inode
function is used to iterate through all inodes of the filesystem. Only inodes that contain
valid blocks, and is not a directory is processed. Inodes up to 10 are reserved and 11 is

lost+found, so they’re not included either. Within the iteration loop, a call to
ext2fs_block_iterate is executed with a function pointer (callback). The pointer
refers to a function we define that contains logic to record the block number and map it to
the inode currently being processed. Once all inodes are processed, the filesystem could
be unloaded, and KVM can resume loading the virtual disk.

5.6 Translating Sectors to Logical Blocks
A block is the most basic unit of a filesystem; on the other hand disks use sectors.
Sectors are normally 512 bytes, while our proof of concept use blocks of 1024 bytes. The
KVM code uses sectors, and our shadow lookup table uses blocks. In order to make the
lookup, a translation needs to be performed. Translating from block numbers to sectors
requires the following formula:

 (block × block _ size)  

offset
 + 

sec tor = 
sec
tor
_
size
sec
tor
_
size

 

Translating from sectors to blocks requires the following formula:




offset
  × block _ size
block =  sec tor − 
sec
tor
_
size



The proof of concept handles this translation by providing internal functions

translate_sector_to_block and translate_block_to_sector.

6 Conclusions
From the proof of concept, we are able to determine that observing low level disk
activity; high level information can be inferred. If it is known which blocks belong to
which files, a shadow filesystem can be built and used to do a reverse lookup based on
blocks/sectors being read/written. This would theoretically work on any filesystem that
provides APIs for reading the internal data structures. There would have to be a method
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of synchronizing changes from the loaded filesystem to the shadow, otherwise data from
the shadow filesystem would become stale.
It would also help that the VMM is open source, so we can inject code to do the lookup.
Being able to pull IMA functionality out of the kernel and into the hypervisor allows for
VMs to run any OS. This also allows any VM to reliably attest to a verifier.

7 Future Work & Challenges
Since the shadow filesystem is being built when the VM is first loaded and doesn't
receive updates during operation, the research is unable to fully shadow the filesystems
state during the operation of the VM. Filesystem modifications are kept in memory in the
virtual machine, so there's no trivial method of updating the shadow filesystem as the
original filesystem changes.
Modifications to the filesystem such as file writes is an area not covered in this research,
but some analysis on EXT2 file modification has been performed to prepare future work.
The data blocks of a file called ps.sh are monitored and the following behavior is
observed. The file contains the following code:

#!/bin/sh
ls / > /dev/NULL
Figure 7-1: ps.sh Contents

The file is modified in three different ways to show filesystem behavior. Table 7-1
describes the changes that were made and illustrate the blocks of the file after
modification. 1.out shows the original data blocks for the file (inode 8036). In

2.out, the contents of the file changed, but the file size the same (the casing of a word
was changed inside the file). It is observed that the data block pointers remained the
same. When new content is added to the file, the data block pointers change and a new
contiguous group of blocks are allocated to accommodate the new content, as shown in

3.out. When content is removed from the file, the blocks remain the same (4.out).
Table 7-1

summarizes the modifications and the effect it had on the data blocks.
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Table 7-1: File Modifications Summary
Modification

Change in Blocks

Output File

Original

None

1.out

Stayed the same, contents changed

2.out

Changed the file contents (no change
in size)
Contents were added to file

8036;
8036;
8036;
8036;
8036;
8036;
8036;
8036;
8036;
8036;
8036;
8036;
8036;
8036;

file to accommodate new size
Block numbers remain the same,

Contents removed

Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:

New data blocks were allocated to

contents changed

Block
Block
Block
Block
Block
Block
Block
Block
Block
Block
Block
Block
Block
Block

number:
number:
number:
number:
number:
number:
number:
number:
number:
number:
number:
number:
number:
number:

39945
39946
39947
39948
39949
39950
39951
39952
39953
39954
39955
39956
39958
39959

Figure 7-2: 1.out
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
Inode:
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Figure 7-3: 2.out
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Figure 7-5: 4.out

A different file modification scenario could occur where the file /bin/ps could be
removed and replaced with a new one. Files are represented by inodes, and inodes can be
referred to by different file names, if one was to remove /bin/ps and replace it with
another file from a different location, the new /bin/ps would have a different inode. If
the new file is loaded into memory, it would appear as if a totally different file is loaded.
A filename would have to be included to differentiate the two.
Due to the nature of the filesystem, we are not able to easily map file names to the inodes.
This is due to the fact that inodes can have multiple file names associated to it.
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Another aspect of IMA that isn’t part of this research is taking the measurements list,
hashing it and storing it in the TPM. This should theoretically be trivial given the
availability of the TrouSerS [23] TCG software stack.
Finally, logic is needed for non contiguous data blocks for a given inode.
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10 Appendix A
Attached is the source code required for implementation of a shadow filesystem and changes to the KVM
source to support it.

10.1 shadow_fs.c
/*
* shadow filesytem implementation (shadow_fs.c)
*
* Created on: January 17, 2009
*
Author: Sammy Lin <scl9891@cs.rit.edu>
*/
#include "shadow_fs.h"
#define BYTES_PER_SECTOR 512
#define BYTES_PER_BLOCK 1024
ext2_inode_scan scan = NULL;
ext2_filsys fs = NULL;
unsigned int blocks_count;
unsigned int block_size;
/* Our lookup tables */
s_block *blocks_array = NULL;
s_inode *inodes_array = NULL;
/*
* Build the command for creating the loop device
* syntax:
* /sbin/losetup -o offset device image
* Note: this function is internal only, due to the fact that
* this function dynamically allocates memory for the strings
* and requires the caller to free it
*/
static
char
*build_losetup_command(int offset, char *dev, char *image)
{
char *losetup = "/sbin/losetup -o ";
char *fullcommand;
char str_offset[20];
sprintf(str_offset, "%d", offset);
/* 3 = two spaces and a trailing null terminator */
fullcommand = (char *)malloc(strlen(losetup) + (strlen(str_offset) +
strlen(dev) + strlen(image) + 3)
* sizeof(char));
strcpy(fullcommand, losetup);
strcat(fullcommand, str_offset);
strcat(fullcommand, " ");
strcat(fullcommand, dev);
strcat(fullcommand, " ");
strcat(fullcommand, image);
return fullcommand;
}
/*
* Load the filesystem and initialize the error table
*
*/
static
int
load_fs(int offset, char *dev, char *image)
{
int status = 0;
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errcode_t err = 0;
char *losetup_command;
losetup_command = build_losetup_command(offset, dev, image);
status = system(losetup_command);
free(losetup_command);
if(status){
printf("Error creating loop device %s, for image %s\n",
dev, image);
return 1;
}
initialize_ext2_error_table();
/* Open the filesystem */
printf("Opening filesystem %s \n", dev);
err = ext2fs_open(dev, EXT2_FLAG_JOURNAL_DEV_OK,
0, 0, unix_io_manager, &fs);
if(err){
com_err("shadow_fs", err,
"while retrying to open fs %s", dev);
return 1;
}
blocks_count = fs->super->s_blocks_count;
block_size = fs->blocksize;
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Number of blocks: %d, Blocksize: %d \n",
blocks_count, block_size);
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* Build the command for deleting the loop device
* syntax:
* /sbin/losetup -o /dev/loop0
* Note: this function is internal only, due to the fact that
* this function dynamically allocates memory for the strings
* and requires the caller to free it
*/
static
char
*build_losetup_delete_command(char *dev)
{
char *losetup = "/sbin/losetup -d ";
char *fullcommand;
/* 3 = two spaces and a trailing null terminator */
fullcommand = (char *)malloc(strlen(losetup) + strlen(dev) + 3
* sizeof(char));
strcpy(fullcommand, losetup);
strcat(fullcommand, dev);
return fullcommand;
}
/*
* Unload the file system and cleanup used resources
*/
static
int
unload_fs(char *dev)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Removing device: %s\n", dev);
#endif
int status = 0;
errcode_t err = 0;
char *losetup_command;
ext2fs_close_inode_scan(scan);

- 25 -

/* Close the filesystem */
err = ext2fs_close(fs);
if(err){
com_err("shadow_fs", err,
"while trying to close fs %s", dev);
return 1;
}
/* Delete loop device */
losetup_command = build_losetup_delete_command(dev);
status = system(losetup_command);
free(losetup_command);
if(status){
printf("Error removing loop device %s\n", dev);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Build the pseudo file system (our look-up table)
*/
static
int
build_table()
{
char *dev;
/*Initialize the look up tables */
int num_blocks = 0;
int num_inodes = 0;
errcode_t err = 0;
static s_inode *inodes_arr_iter = NULL;
static s_block *blocks_arr_iter = NULL;
num_blocks = fs->super->s_blocks_count;
num_inodes = fs->super->s_inodes_count;
blocks_array = (s_block *) malloc(num_blocks * sizeof(s_block) + 1);
inodes_array = (s_inode *) malloc(num_inodes * sizeof(s_inode));
dev = (char *) malloc(strlen(fs->device_name) + 1);
strcpy(dev, fs->device_name);
inodes_arr_iter = inodes_array;
blocks_arr_iter = blocks_array;
/* Start the scan of the inodes of the filesystem */
err = ext2fs_open_inode_scan(fs, 0, &scan);
if(err){
com_err("shadow_fs", err,
"while trying to establish a scanner for fs %s",
fs->device_name);
return 1;
}
ext2_ino_t inode_num;
struct ext2_inode inode;
err = ext2fs_get_next_inode(scan, &inode_num, &inode);
if(err){
com_err("shadow_fs", err,
"while trying to get next inode for fs %s",
fs->device_name);
return 1;
}
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/*
for each inode, get the inode number, add the inode number to the
array of inode numbers,
for each block for that inode, create a s_block struct containing
the block number and a pointer to inode number for which it belongs
*/
while( inode_num != 0 ){
inodes_arr_iter->inode_num = inode_num;
inodes_arr_iter->i_size = inode.i_size;
inodes_arr_iter->first_block = blocks_arr_iter;
/* get the filename */
blocks_arr_iter->inode_p = inodes_arr_iter;
blocks_arr_iter->first = 1; //Make this block the first
if(ext2fs_inode_has_valid_blocks(&inode) &&
ext2fs_check_directory(fs, inode_num) ==
EXT2_ET_NO_DIRECTORY &&
inode.i_blocks != 0 &&
inode_num > 11){
//inodes up to 10 are reserved, inode 11 is lost+found
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("INODE Number %d, has %d blocks, size: %d:\n",
inode_num, inode.i_blocks, inode.i_size);
#endif
//inodes_arr_iter->has_first = 0;
ext2fs_block_iterate(fs, inode_num,
BLOCK_FLAG_DATA_ONLY,
NULL, block_iterate_callback,
&blocks_arr_iter);
}
inodes_arr_iter++;
err = ext2fs_get_next_inode(scan, &inode_num, &inode);
if(err){
com_err("filesystemviewer", err,
"while trying to get next inode for fs %s",
fs->device_name);
return 1;
}
}
//*inodes_arr_iter = NULL;
unload_fs(dev);
return 0;
}

/*
* Given a block number, and the beginning of the array of blocks,
* find the inode for which that block belongs
* Returns 0 if found, 1 if not found
*/
static
int
get_inode_from_block2(const blk_t block_num, s_block *blockp, int len,
s_inode **inode)
{
int i;
for(i = 0; i < len; i++, blockp++){
if(blockp->block_num == block_num){
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Found inode: %u\n",
(blockp->inode_p)->inode_num);
#endif
*inode = blockp->inode_p;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
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/*
* Translate a sector number to a block number
*/
blk_t
translate_sector_to_block(unsigned int sector, s_shadow_fs *sfs)
{
/*
To translate a sector to a block, we need to apply the
following formula:
block = (sector - offset (in sectors) * 512)/1024
*/
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("s2b sector: %u, offset=%u\n", sector, sfs->offset);
#endif
return ((sector - (sfs->offset / BYTES_PER_SECTOR)) *
BYTES_PER_SECTOR)/BYTES_PER_BLOCK;
}
/*
* Translate a block number to a sector number
*/
unsigned int
translate_block_to_sector(blk_t block, s_shadow_fs *sfs)
{
/*
To translate a block to a sector, we need to apply the
following formula:
sector = ((blocks*1024)/512)+(sfs->offset / BYTES_PER_SECTOR)
*/
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("b2s sector: %u, offset=%u\n", block, sfs->offset);
#endif
return ((block*BYTES_PER_BLOCK)/BYTES_PER_SECTOR)+
(sfs->offset/BYTES_PER_SECTOR);
}
/*
* Check if a sector is first of a file
*/
int
is_first(unsigned int sector_num, s_shadow_fs *sfs)
{
//translate the sector to block, then find if this block is first in a file
int i;
s_block *block_iter;
blk_t block_num = translate_sector_to_block(sector_num, sfs);
block_iter = blocks_array;
for(i = 0; i < blocks_count; i++){
if(block_iter->block_num == block_num){
if(block_iter->first == 1)
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
block_iter++;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Public interface to the shadow file system - Open the filesystem
*/
int
open_shadow_fs(s_shadow_fs *sfs)
{
load_fs(sfs->offset, sfs->dev, sfs->image);
build_table();
return 0;
}
/*
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* Public interface to the shadow file system - Close the filesystem
*/
int
close_shadow_fs(s_shadow_fs *sfs)
{
free(inodes_array);
free(blocks_array);
return 0;
}
/*
* Callback used by libext2fs for iterating the blocks of a filesystem
*/
int
block_iterate_callback(ext2_filsys FS, blk_t *BLOCKNR, int BLOCKCNT,
void *PRIVATE)
{
s_block **sblockpp = (s_block**)PRIVATE;
(*sblockpp)->block_num = *BLOCKNR;
s_inode *temp_inop = (*sblockpp)->inode_p;
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Inode: %u; Block number: %u\n",
((*sblockpp)->inode_p)->inode_num, *BLOCKNR );
#endif
(*sblockpp)++;
(*sblockpp)->inode_p = temp_inop;
(*sblockpp)->first = 0;
return 0;
}
/*
* Returns the hash for the inode, this value is dynamically allocated
* it must be free'd once it's purpose has been fulfilled
*/
int
hash_inode(s_inode const *inode, s_shadow_fs *sfs, unsigned char **hash,
unsigned int *hash_len)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Hashing inode %u\n", inode->inode_num);
#endif
int
fd;
unsigned int
sector_num;
off_t
off;
unsigned char buf[BYTES_PER_BLOCK];
char
*digest = "sha1";
//unsigned int bytes_rec = 0;
unsigned int
left_to_read = inode->i_size;
unsigned int
read_amt; //How much to read
ssize_t
got;
/* OpenSSL EVP variables */
EVP_MD_CTX
mdctx;
const EVP_MD
*md;
//unsigned char
md_value[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
//unsigned char
*md_value;
*hash = (unsigned char*)malloc(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE *
sizeof(unsigned char));
fd = open(sfs->image, O_RDONLY, O_LARGEFILE);
if(fd == -1){
printf("Could not open image %s for reading %s\n", sfs->image,
strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
md = EVP_get_digestbyname(digest);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mdctx);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mdctx, md, NULL);
//foreach block do hash it
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//How do we get the blocks of a inode?
//hash block, block++ while block != first?
//if the first block is NOT first, report error
if((inode->first_block)->first != 1){
printf("Expected first block, but didn't get it\n");
free(hash);
return 1;
}
s_block *block_iter = inode->first_block;
//printf("Size of this inode: %u\n", inode->i_size);
do{
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Starting loop\n");
if( block_iter == NULL){
printf("ERROR READING NEXT BLOCK\n");
}
printf("Hashing block %u\n", block_iter->block_num);
#endif
read_amt = (left_to_read > BYTES_PER_BLOCK) ?
BYTES_PER_BLOCK : left_to_read;
/*if( left_to_read > NUM_BYTES)
read_amt = NUM_BYTES;
else
read_amt = left_to_read;
*/
sector_num = translate_block_to_sector(block_iter->block_num,
sfs);
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Sector num being read %u\n", sector_num );
printf("Going to read %u bytes\n", read_amt);
#endif
off = lseek(fd, sector_num * BYTES_PER_SECTOR, SEEK_SET);
got = read(fd, buf, read_amt);
if(read_amt < BYTES_PER_BLOCK){
buf[read_amt] = '\0';
}
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Contents: %s####\nSize: %" PRId64 "\nSupposedly reading %u\n",
buf, strlen(buf), read_amt);
printf("Moved %" PRId64 " bytes from beginning of file\n", off);
if(got < 0 ){
printf("An error occured during reading\n");
printf("GOT %" PRId64 " bytes\n", got);
}
#endif
//bytes_rec+= strlen(buf);
left_to_read -= BYTES_PER_BLOCK;
EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, buf, got);
block_iter++;
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Advancing to next block\n");
if(block_iter == NULL)
printf("Next pointer is NULL\n");
printf("Next block number: %u first? %d\n",
block_iter->block_num, block_iter->first);
printf("Ending loop\n");
#endif
}while(block_iter->first != 1);
close(fd);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mdctx, *hash, hash_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mdctx);
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Returning\n");
#endif
return 0;
}
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/*
* Get an inode given the block
*/
int
get_inode_from_block(const blk_t block_num, s_inode **inode)
{
return get_inode_from_block2(block_num, blocks_array,
blocks_count, inode);
}
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10.2 shadow_fs.h
/*
* Header file for shadow file-system implementation (shadow_fs.h)
*
* Created on: Jan 17, 2009
*
Author: Sammy Lin <scl9891@cs.rit.edu>
*/
#ifndef _SHADOW_FS_H
#define _SHADOW_FS_H
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include

<ext2fs/ext2fs.h>
<ext2fs/ext2_fs.h>
<ext2fs/ext2_io.h>
<et/com_err.h>
<ext2fs/ext2_err.h>
<openssl/evp.h>
<stdio.h>
<stdlib.h>
<inttypes.h>
<unistd.h>
<string.h>
<errno.h>
<sys/stat.h>
<sys/types.h>
<fcntl.h>

struct s_inode;
typedef struct s_block{
int first; /* First block in the file? */
blk_t block_num;
struct s_inode *inode_p;
}s_block;
typedef struct s_inode{
ext2_ino_t
inode_num;
unsigned int
i_size;
//Used to determine if the first block for this inode has been set
int
has_first;
s_block
*first_block;
/*
Since an inode can possibly have multiple filenames
files could point to the "first" file name that represents
this inode
*/
//char *files;
}s_inode;
typedef struct s_shadow_fs{
char *image;
char *dev;
int offset;//THIS SHOULD BE A UNSIGNED INT
int (*get_inode_from_block)(const blk_t block_num, s_inode **inode);
int (*open_shadow_fs)(struct s_shadow_fs *sfs);
int (*close_shadow_fs)(struct s_shadow_fs *sfs);
}s_shadow_fs;
extern
int
open_shadow_fs(s_shadow_fs *sfs);
extern
int
is_first(unsigned int sector_num, s_shadow_fs *sfs);
extern
blk_t
translate_sector_to_block(unsigned int sector, s_shadow_fs *sfs);
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extern
unsigned int
translate_block_to_sector(blk_t block, s_shadow_fs *sfs);
extern
int
close_shadow_fs(s_shadow_fs *sfs);
extern
int
get_inode_from_block(const blk_t block_num, s_inode **inode);
extern
int
block_iterate_callback(ext2_filsys FS, blk_t *BLOCKNR, int BLOCKCNT,
void *PRIVATE);
extern
int
hash_inode(s_inode const *inode, s_shadow_fs *sfs, unsigned char **hash,
unsigned int *hash_len);
#endif
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10.3 Makefile
#Compiler macros
CC = gcc
CC_OPTS = -Wall
#Files
C_FILES = shadow_fs.c main.c
#H_FILES = shadow_fs.h
OBJ_FILES = $(SOURCEFILES:.c=.o)
SOURCEFILES = $(C_FILES)
#SOURCEFILES = $(C_FILES) $(H_FILES)
EXECUTABLE = shadow_tester
LIBS = -lext2fs -lcom_err -lcrypto
#Targets
all: clean $(EXECUTABLE)
$(EXECUTABLE): OBJ
$(CC) $(CC_OPTS) $(DEBUG) $(OBJ_FILES) $(LIBS) -o $(EXECUTABLE)
OBJ:
$(CC) $(CC_OPTS) $(DEBUG) -c $(SOURCEFILES)
clean:
rm -rf $(OBJ_FILES) $(EXECUTABLE)
hash: OBJ HASH_OBJ
$(CC) hashthis.o shadow_fs.o $(LIBS) -o hashthis
HASH_OBJ:
$(CC) -c hashthis.c
debug:
$(MAKE) $(MAKEFILE) DEBUG="-DDEBUG"
hash_debug:
$(MAKE) $(MAKEFILE) hash DEBUG="-DDEBUG"
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10.4 block-raw-posix.patch
23a24
> #include "../shadow_fs/shadow_fs.h"
28a30
> #include <unistd.h>
91c93
<
--> s_shadow_fs s_fs;
675a678,705
>
if( is_first(sector_num, &s_fs) == 1){
>
blk_t block_num = translate_sector_to_block(sector_num, &s_fs);
>
s_inode *inode;
>
if( inode == NULL){
>
printf("Could not allocate space for inode\n");
>
return 1;
>
}
>
>
if(!s_fs.get_inode_from_block(block_num, &inode))
>
printf( "Found the block\n");
>
else
>
printf( "Block not found\n");
>
>
printf( "Block number %u, belongs to inode number %u",
>
block_num, inode->inode_num );
>
printf(" and its SHA1 hash is:\n");
>
unsigned char *hash;
>
unsigned int hash_len;
>
int i;
>
hash_inode(inode, &s_fs, &hash, &hash_len);
>
for(i = 0; i < hash_len; i++)
>
printf("%02x", hash[i]);
>
>
printf("\n");
>
free(hash);
>
}
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